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Abstract	
In	Zambia,	privately-owned	copper	mines	consume	more	than	half	of	the	electrical	energy	produced.	
By	contrast,	only	22%	of	private	households	are	connected	to	the	national	grid.	Against	this	
background,	the	paper	analyses	energy	distribution	in	Zambia's	Northwestern	Province,	where	new	
copper	mines	have	opened	following	the	hike	in	copper	prices	during	the	2000's.	Unlike	rural	
families,	residents	in	the	three	new	urban	centres	in	theory	have	access	to	electricity.	Since	2015,	
however,	the	country	suffers	from	an	electricity	crisis	partly	as	a	result	of	poor	rainfalls	in	the	
2014/2015	season.	In	a	situation	of	undersupply,	the	mine	keeps	unlimited	access	to	electricity	
which	privileges	its	operations	and	the	housing	areas.	Daily	blackouts	for	the	rest	of	the	town	
entrench	existing	inequalities	and	produce	new	ones.	Based	on	long-term	ethnographic	research,	the	
paper	examines	how	electrical	infrastructure	and	the	possibility	for	forms	of	sociality	relate	both	in	
the	everyday	and	in	the	political	discourse.	I	show	how	unequal	electrical	infrastructure	contributes	
to	the	structuring	of	people	into	new	social	classes,	and	how,	consequently,	infrastructure	is	political	
from	the	start.	By	reflecting	on	the	political	and	social	consequences	of	unequal	electricity	supply,	I	
provide	preliminary	thoughts	on	an	energy	distribution	ethic.		
Introduction	
In	the	Republic	of	Zambia,	78%	of	households	are	champions	in	using	“green”	substitutes	to	nuclear,	
coal	or	diesel	generated	power	such	as	solar	panels,	wood	and	charcoal	(Central	Statistical	Office	
Zambia	2013,	25).	And	unlike	many	of	its	neighbouring	countries	and	countries	in	the	global	North,	
Zambia	relies	on	hydropower	for	94%	of	its	electrical	energy.	However,	this	still	raises	critical	
questions	about	the	ethics	of	energy	systems.	The	problem	is	not	so	much	environmental	
sustainability	of	production	as	justice	of	distribution:	Mining	companies	use	half	of	the	country’s	
electrical	energy	for	their	operations,	while	only	22%	of	households	have	access	to	electrical	power.	
Zambia	usually	has	sufficient	rainfall	to	fill	its	dams	and	sell	surplus	power	to	neighbouring	countries.	
Until	recently,	electricity	supply	has	never	been	considered	as	a	problem	in	official	discourse.	This	
changed	in	2015	when	for	the	first	time	there	was	insufficient	electricity	to	supply	all	customers.	Cuts	
started	to	be	inflicted	onto	domestic	customers,	so	that	today,	in	Gupta’s	words	for	India,	“being	
connected	to	the	grid	and	having	electricity	are	two	different	issues”	(2015,	559).	As	a	result	of	poor	
rainfall	in	the	2014/2015	rainy	season,	electricity	shortages,	so-called	“load	shedding”,	now	happen	
across	the	country	and	affect	all	actors	–	albeit	unequally.	Households	which	are	not	connected	to	
the	national	grid	are	also	indirectly	affected	by	the	power	crisis,	which,	among	other	things	let’s	
prices	for	staple	foods	(such	as	maize	and	oil)	rise	and	makes	public	services	even	less	reliable.	In	
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addition	to	that,	the	commodity	price	boom	which	started	in	the	early	2000s	turned	into	a	bust	in	
2015	again.	Currently,	the	prices	are	down	to	about	half	of	what	they	were	at	their	peak	in	2011.	In	
combination	with	low	global	copper	prices,	energy	shortages	have	affected	Zambia’s	exports	and	the	
Kwacha’s	exchange	rates.	It	has	become	clear	that	although	hydro-electric	power	is	a	renewable	
source	of	energy,	it	is	not	necessarily	a	reliable	source	of	energy	(for	a	similar	situation	in	Accra,	
Ghana,	see	Silver	2015).	This	situation	does	not	affect	all	people	equally;	when	electricity	became	
scarcer,	it	also	became	even	more	unevenly	distributed.		
Although	Zambia	has	a	century-long	history	of	extraction,	the	cases	I	consider	in	this	article	are	new	
sites	of	mineral	extraction.	The	empirical	field	of	enquiry	is	the	Solwezi	region	in	the	Northwestern	
Province	of	Zambia.	In	the	region,	three	large-scale	mines	have	been	opened	since	2003	in	reaction	
to	the	recovery	of	global	copper	prices.	Three	new	urban	centres	have	developed	around	the	three	
mines;	the	rest	of	the	region	consists	of	some	peri-urban	and	mainly	rural	localities.	Power	lines	and	
electrical	power	have	only	recently	been	introduced	as	an	infrastructure	to	a	large	part	of	the	area.	
Studying	electrical	power	in	this	region	is	particularly	interesting	because	we	can	witness	the	parallel	
development	of	rural	electrification,	an	ordinary	albeit	slow	process	across	the	country,	and	massive	
electro-infrastructural	development,	that	is	“selectively	territorialized	investment”	(Ferguson	2005)	
through	private	mining	companies	trying	to	secure	unhindered	extraction	in	selected	onshore	
“enclaves”	(Appel	2012a).	
I	conducted	ethnographic	research	in	the	region	for	14	months	between	2013	and	2016,	which	
included	interviews	and	conversations	with	local	state	officials	and	mine	employees,	but	most	of	all	
participant	observation	in	the	daily	life	of	ordinary	town	dwellers	in	a	rapidly	urbanizing	region.	This	
research	enables	me	to	show	how	uneven	access	to	electricity	contributes	to	social	stratification.	I	
examine	processes	that	result	in	the	ordering	of	people	into	differentiated,	hierarchically	layered	
groups	(social	differentiation)	whose	members	are	aware	of	the	discrepancy	between	them	and	
members	of	another	group	(social	stratification).	While	social	differentiation	is	not	necessarily	a	
problem	for	the	actors	and	groups	involved,	for	it	to	be	called	social	stratification,	it	requires	their	
judgment.	Infrastructure,	as	I	will	show,	has	constitutive	power.	Studying	the	ways	in	which	lack	of	
electric	power	affects	social	relations	gives	us	clues	about	what	might	happen	in	the	global	North	
when	ethical	dilemmas	of	distribution	rise	in	times	of	crisis,	natural	disaster,	shortage	or	extreme	
increase	of	prices.	To	be	sure,	my	aim	here	is	not	to	reduce	the	global	South	to	a	testing	ground	for	
possible	future	scenarios	in	the	global	North.	Rather,	the	focus	on	electricity	as	the	key	factor	for	a	
productive	privatized	extractive	industry	points	to	the	reliance	of	the	global	North	on	the	natural	
resources	from	the	South	(such	as	copper,	cobalt	and	gold	from	Zambia),	and	the	need	to	address	
questions	of	(re)distribution	and	sustainability	with	a	global	outlook.	In	other	words,	the	politics	of	
energy	distribution	on	this	extractive	frontier	of	the	global	economy	are	affected	not	only	by	local	
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and	national	forces,	but	by	global	forces	as	well.	In	this	article,	I	thus	propose	to	expand	the	focus	of	
what	we	should	be	talking	about	when	we	think	about	the	ethical	implications	of	growing	human	
reliance	on	electricity.	I	will	propose	some	preliminary	thoughts	on	an	energy	distribution	ethics.	
After	a	brief	overview	of	studies	on	electricity	in	the	social	sciences	(1),	I	look	at	the	energy	and	
mining	sector	in	Zambia	(2)	and	in	a	new	mining	region	(the	Solwezi	region)	more	specifically	(3).	I	
explore	how	planning	processes	of	a	new	“company	town”,	Kalumbila,	and	the	expansion	of	the	
national	grid	contribute	to	social	stratification	(4).	I	then	present	ethnographic	data	on	how	urban	
residents	deal	with	daily	power	outages	in	Solwezi	town,	an	old	administrative	and	since	recently	
booming	mine	town	(5).	Unequal	energy	distribution	and	the	power	crisis	provide	everyday	
experiences	of	in-	and	exclusion.	As	such,	it	is	a	political	and	increasingly	politicised	topic,	which	turns	
into	a	source	for	ordinary	town	residents	to	criticize	the	local	elite	(6).	In	the	conclusion	(7),	I	provide	
some	preliminary	thoughts	on	a	global	energy	distribution	ethics.	
1	Electricity	and	Sociality		
Electrical	infrastructure	has	been	studied	from	a	variety	of	scholarly	perspectives,	be	it	Deleuzeian,	
Foucauldian	or	with	an	ontological	approach	(Bennett	2005;	Boyer	2015).1	While	a	large	part	of	the	
literature	on	energy	is	based	on	the	experience	of	the	omnipresence	of	electrical	energy	in	Western	
countries	(Sovacool	2014,	22),	many	scholars	have	also	criticized	the	underlying	assumption	that	
electricity	is	all	pervasive,	connects	all	spheres	of	everyday	life,	and	that	“we	conveniently	ignore	
whole	electroscapes	until	something	goes	wrong”	(Boyer	2015).	By	studying	electricity	in	“imperfect”	
contexts,	scholars	point	out	the	uneven	geographies	of	urban	energy	networks	(e.g.	Luque-Ayala	and	
Silver	2016a)	and	show	parallels	between	uneven	energy	distribution	and	inequality	in	the	global	
South	(eg.	Love	and	Garwood	2016;	Gupta	2015;	Winther	2016).	Some	researchers	focus	on	the	ways	
the	idea	of	electricity	as	a	public	good	triggers	protest	actions	among	those	who	do	not	have	access	
to	it	(Alexandri	and	Chatzi	2016;	Kirsch	2005,	2016;	Schnitzler	2016);	others	focus	on	the	relation	
between	electricity	and	urban	politics	(Luque-Ayala	and	Silver	2016).	My	contribution	draws	on	this	
critical	corpus	of	studies	of	electricity	networks	that	centres	on	inequality	and	power	in	relation	to	
energy	infrastructure.	
Unsurprisingly,	there	is	a	number	of	studies	examining	a	key	characteristic	of	“imperfect”	electrical	
power	head-on:	blackouts	(cf.	Silver	2015).	In	her	article	Circuits	and	Currents:	Dynamics	of	disruption	
in	New	York	City	Blackouts,	Rupp	(2016)	examines	what	happened	during	four	blackouts	in	New	York	
City	between	1965	and	2012.	She	shows	that	blackouts	produce	some	kind	of	liminality	where	
																																																						
1	For	an	overview	of	the	ethnographic,	anthropological	and	sociological	literature	on	energy,	see	the	introduction	to	this	
special	issue	(High	and	Smith,	this	issue),	and	for	some	challenges	facing	social	scientific	research	on	energy,	see	Stirling	
(2014).	
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people	start	relating	to	one	another	differently.	From	this	insight,	she	derives	electricity’s	three	main	
characteristics:	it	is	invisible,	indispensable	and	omnipresent.	She	then	projects	this	emergent	
liminality	during	blackouts	to	bygone	times.	Before	we	were	completely	defined	by	the	power	of	
electricity,	she	argues,	people	lived	as	Mitmenschen	(people	living	with	one	another).	Today,	we	live	
as	Nebenmenschen,	that	is	alongside	one	another	(Schütz	1967).2		
I	take	the	distinction	between	Mitmenschen	and	Nebenmenschen	sociality	as	an	analytical	tool	for	
lived	relatedness,	and	examine	how	groups	of	people	shift	between	Mitmenschen	and	
Nebenmenschen	relationships	in	light	of	the	governing	effects	of	electrical	infrastructure.	In	Zambia,	
and	in	the	broader	Southern	African	region	for	that	matter,	where	electricity	is	an	emerging	
infrastructure	(cf.	Winther	and	Wilhite	2015),	electric	energy	is	visible,	dispensable	and	faulty.	In	the	
contemporary	Zambian	context	of	faulty	energy	supply,	human	relations	are	most	likely	not	as	
unproblematic	as	suggested	for	bygone	times	before	complete	electrification	(cf.	Platt	1991).	In	this	
article,	I	thus	seek	to	track	the	role	of	electricity	to	help	create	forms	of	Mitmenschen	and	
Nebenmenschen	sociality.	
Infrastructure	is	a	manifestation	of	inequalities,	domination	and	control,	but	it	also	helps	to	create	
forms	of	governance	and	social	differentiation.	Electricity	play	a	crucial	role	in	this	process.	I	agree	
with	Boyer’s	suggestion	to	expand	Foucault’s	biopower	with	“energopower”	(2014).	To	explore	the	
effects	of	a	faulty,	unreliable	and	visible	infrastructure	and	its	relationship	to	governing	attempts,	I	
hence	also	draw	on	Latour	(2007).	With	Latour,	I	understand	energy	as	a	socio-political	and	economic	
field	“where	any	thing	that	does	modify	a	state	of	affairs	by	making	a	difference”	(2007,	71)	must	be	
considered.	Electrical	infrastructure	plays	a	role	in	human	interaction.	Agency,	as	Latour	suggests,	
springs	from	our	interaction	with	human	and	non-human	entities;	a	notion	Barad	confirmed	as	
“intra-action”	(2003).	I	take	this	insight	into	material	efficacy	as	a	starting	point	to	focus	on	the	
creation	of	social	groups	through	infrastructural	governance	processes,	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	
possibilities	of	relating	to	one	another	across	these	groups,	on	the	other.	
2	Zambia’s	Energy	and	Mining	Sector			
Ever	since	copper	was	first	mined	commercially	in	the	late	1920s	under	the	British	South	Africa	
Company,	the	mining	sector	has	constituted	the	backbone	of	the	economy	in	what	today	is	Zambia.	
In	the	course	of	ninety	years	of	industrialization	and	urbanization,	poor	and	rural	communities	have	
often	been	removed	from	their	homes	to	make	space	for	large	infrastructure	projects.	The	most	
prominent	example	in	Zambian	history	is	the	resettlement	of	approximately	57.000	people	for	the	
																																																						
2	Gupta	(2015)	makes	a	similar	argument	for	North	Indian	villages	before	electrification	in	the	mid-1980s.	
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construction	of	Kariba	Dam	in	the	1950s,	the	then	biggest	man-made	dam	built	to	serve	the	mines	in	
the	Copperbelt	(Colson	1971;	McGregor	2009;	Tischler	2013).	
Today,	the	private	large-scale	copper	mines	are	still	the	biggest	consumers	of	electricity.	Zambia	has	
two	main	sources	of	electricity:	the	hydroelectric	power	plants	at	the	Kafue	Gorge	and	the	Kariba	
Dam	(Kariba	North	and	Kariba	North	Bank	Extension).	Together,	they	produce	about	94%	of	Zambia’s	
electricity	supply	(Energy	Regulation	Board	2016,	3);	the	rest	comes	from	diesel,	heavy	fuel	oil	and	
solar	generation	plants.	Poor	rainfall	during	the	2014/2015	rainy	season	resulted	in	low	dam	water	
levels	and	consequently	a	considerable	shortfall	of	supply	of	electricity.	Another	reason	for	lower	
energy	production	is	poor	generation	capacity	of	the	Kariba	power	plant.	Firstly,	state	critics	say	that	
new	Chinese	turbines	worked	inefficiently,	and,	secondly,	an	increasingly	unsound	wall	threatens	the	
dam’s	stability	and	would	urgently	necessitate	rehabilitation	work.	This	came	on	top	of	economic	
challenges	linked	to	a	slump	in	copper	prices,	mainly	due	to	sinking	demand	from	China,	which	
purchases	about	40	percent	of	copper	produced	globally.	
The	main	electricity	provider,	Zambia	Electricity	Supply	Corporation	Limited	(ZESCO),	was	established	
in	1970	and	the	Government	is	the	sole	shareholder.	ZESCO	engages	in	cross-border	trading	of	
electricity	through	the	Southern	African	Power	Pool	and	bilateral	markets.	Typically,	Zambia	exports	
five	times	more	electricity	than	it	imports,	but	in	2014/2015,	its	power	imports	increased	by	more	
than	6000	percent	(Energy	Regulation	Board	2016,	8).	Amidst	complaints	about	bad	performance	
and	inefficiency	of	state-run	ZESCO,	calls	for	privatization	are	on	the	rise.3	The	Zambian	government	
attempts	to	invest	in	new	electrical	infrastructure.	Due	to	lack	of	funds,	it	tries	to	engage	in	public-
private	partnerships	or	looks	for	donor	funding.	The	state	tries	to	attract	investors	to	set	up	solar	
projects	for	affordable	electricity	in	rural	areas	(BMWi	2016).	At	the	2016	Annual	Meeting	of	the	
African	Development	Bank	in	Lusaka	(23	–	27	May	2016)	under	the	theme	of	Energy	and	Climate	
Change,	the	delegate	for	Zambia,	ZESCO’s	Managing	Director,	argued	that	“Lighting	up	and	Powering	
Africa”	–	one	of	the	ADB’s	five	priority	areas	–	could	only	become	reality	through	public-private	
partnerships.4	Most	recently,	the	Ministry	of	Energy	started	negotiations	with	China	and	Russia	in	
relation	to	plans	to	set	up	nuclear	energy	infrastructure.5	Also,	the	European	Union	signed	a	
€65million	grant–	co-financed	with	the	European	Investment	Bank	–	to	rehabilitate	the	low	voltage	
distribution	network	and	install	new	connections	in	the	Lusaka	City	area.6	Up	to	2017,	however,	
																																																						
3	Late	in	2016,	the	government	announced	its	intention	to	privatise	State	Owned	Enterprises	including	ZESCO,	which	was	
fiercely	opposed	by	the	unions.	https://www.lusakatimes.com/2016/11/29/zesco-workers-oppose-pending-privatisation/		
4	http://www.afdb.org/en/annual-meetings-2016/	
5	https://diggers.news/local/2017/05/17/zambia-moves-closer-to-nuclear-energy-production/	(Zambia	moves	closer	to	
Nuclear	energy	production,	17	May	2017,	News	Diggers,	online.		
6	https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/18954/european-union-signs-eu65-million-grant-zambia-
improve-access-energy_en	
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these	partnerships	have	only	produced	declarations	of	intent	and	could	not	revert	the	power	crisis.	
Load	shedding	has	the	effect	of	a	vicious	circle,	as	it	decreases	production	capacity	which	in	turn	
leads	to	more	load	shedding.	
In	2015	and	2016,	planned	and	unplanned	load	shedding	became	the	norm.	Tariffs	for	domestic	
consumers	increased	(Energy	Regulation	Board	2016,	23),	a	decision	which	was	first	reversed	by	
President	Lungu	in	January	2016	when	his	election	campaign	for	re-election	in	August	2016	started	
to	gain	momentum,	but	was	approved	by	the	Energy	Regulation	Board	and	implemented	in	May	
2017.7	For	the	period	between	September	to	December	2015,	for	instance,	there	was	a	power	deficit	
of	around	560	to	1.000	MW	(peak	demand	would	be	2.616	MW)	(Energy	Regulation	Board	2016,	1).	
As	a	result,	ZESCO	increased	the	frequency	and	duration	of	load	shedding.	In	2015	and	2016,	the	
majority	of	households,	but	also	commercial	and	industrial	consumers	across	the	country,	often	
experienced	eight	or	more	hours	of	power	cuts	per	day.	The	mines	are,	however,	largely	exempt	
from	cuts.		
Mining	constitutes	the	backbone	of	the	Zambian	economy.	The	country’s	economic	history	can	be	
explained	along	fluctuations	of	global	copper	prices.	Five	years	after	independence	in	1964,	the	
mines	were	nationalized.	Under	the	regime	of	the	nationalized	Zambia	Consolidated	Copper	Mines	
(ZCCM),	electricity	was	often	free	for	workers	and	their	families,	together	with	water,	education,	
health	provision,	transportation,	and	housing.	In	the	1970s,	global	copper	prices	dropped	as	a	result	
of	the	oil	crisis,	and	the	Zambian	state	has	since	struggled	to	provide	and	maintain	public	
infrastructure	across	the	country.	Between	1997	and	2002,	as	part	of	the	World	Bank	Structural	
Adjustment	Program,	the	state’s	ZCCM	was	unbundled	into	units	and	sold	off	to	international	
investors	in	accordance	with	the	new	Mines	and	Minerals	Act	of	1995	(Fraser	and	Lungu	2007;	Fraser	
and	Larmer	2010).	When	the	mines	were	sold	to	foreign	investors,	special	‘development	agreements’	
were	signed	between	the	state	and	the	investors,	containing	provisions	which	later	proved	a	
hindrance	to	collect	revenue	(Lungu	2008).	The	provisions	allowed	mines	to	outsource	some	of	the	
operations	to	contractors	which	directly	led	to	casualization	of	workers.	The	companies	were	also	
exempt	from	payment	of	taxes	on	electricity	for	a	certain	period	of	time.	Shortly	after	re-
privatization	of	the	mines	in	the	early	2000s,	the	companies	profited	from	China’s	growth	and	the	
ensuing	high	global	copper	prices.	The	mines	mainly	need	electricity	for	providing	underground	mine	
ventilation,	for	hauling	ore	out	of	the	ground,	for	crushing	ore	and	extracting	copper	by	electrolysis.	
																																																						
7	https://www.lusakatimes.com/2016/01/03/president-lungu-u-turns-on-new-electricity-tariffs/	In	May	2017,	the	Energy	
Regulation	Board	approved	ZESCO’s	application	to	increase	electricity	tariffs	by	50%	effective	May	1,	2017,	and	25%	by	
September	1,	2017.	The	ERB’s	press	statement	can	be	accessed	here:	
http://www.erb.org.zm/press/statements/tariffDecisionSpeech10.05.2017.pdf	and	the	revised	electricity	tariffs	effective	
on	May	15	here:	http://www.erb.org.zm/downloads/eregulation/erbApprovedTariffScheduleMay2017.pdf	(last	accessed	
May	17,	2017)	
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The	expansion	of	mining	activities	in	the	early	2000s	possibly	contributed	to	the	power	crisis.	Most	
mines	purchase	energy	from	the	Copperbelt	Energy	Corporation	(CEC),	which	has	a	bulk	supply	
agreement	with	ZESCO.8	CEC	grew	out	of	ZCCM	in	1997	and	is	an	independent	company	listed	on	the	
Lusaka	Stock	Exchange,	which	transmits	energy	purchased	from	ZESCO	and	distributes	it	to	the	
mining	industry	on	the	Copperbelt	and	in	the	Northwestern	Province	at	high	voltage.	
Even	if	they	were	connected	to	the	grid,	many	Zambians	cannot	afford	to	pay	for	electricity,	excluded	
from	what	McDonald	(2008b)	calls	electric	capitalism.	Across	Zambia,	in	rural	and	urban	households,	
the	main	source	used	for	lighting	is	the	candle	(27.7%	in	2010),	followed	by	electricity	from	the	public	
grid	(22%),	paraffin	(20.3%)	and	solar	power	(2.9%)	(Central	Statistical	Office	Zambia	2013,	25ff.).	In	
rural	households,	electricity	as	a	source	of	lighting	is	used	by	3.1%	of	households	only,	contrary	to	
49.8%	in	urban	areas.	Across	the	Northwestern	Province,	only	8.1%	of	households	use	electricity	for	
lighting.	For	cooking,	wood	is	the	main	source	of	energy,	used	by	53.4%	of	households	across	
Zambia,	followed	by	charcoal	(29.1%)	and	electricity	(16.9%).	In	rural	areas,	cooking	with	wood	(85%)	
or	charcoal	(12.2%)	is	even	more	widespread,	while	only	2.1%	of	rural	households	use	electricity	for	
preparing	meals.	In	urban	areas,	electricity	is	used	by	38.6%	after	charcoal	(53.9%)	and	before	wood	
(7%).	Again,	the	Northwestern	Province	is	below	average	in	terms	of	its	access	to	electricity;	only	
5.3%	of	households	use	electric	power	to	cook	their	meals.	These	numbers	show	that	farmers	in	the	
rural	parts	of	the	Solwezi	region	are	generally	grappling	with	the	lack	of	access	to	electricity.	For	
them,	not	having	electric	power	to	light	or	cook	is	rather	normal.	
While	all	households	who	have	access	to	electricity	were	subject	to	load	shedding,	the	mining	sector	
further	increased	the	differentiation	between	households	and	the	mining	sector.	This	favoured	
treatment	is	an	expression	of	the	sector’s	economic	power	and	unequal	access	to	decision	makers.	
The	mining	sector	is	in	fact	one	of	the	few	sectors	that	increased	its	power	consumption	from	2014	
to	2015	by	6.4%.	It	consumed	54,5,%	of	the	total	electricity	in	2015,	followed	by	the	domestic	sector	
with	30,4%	(Energy	Regulation	Board	2016,	9).		
3	The	Solwezi	Region:	a	new	mining	area	
Across	Zambia,	the	main	urban	areas	are	supplied	with	electricity	through	the	national	grid,	while	in	
some	rural	areas,	electricity	is	mainly	supplied	by	diesel	generators	run	by	ZESCO.	The	diesel	power	
generation	plants	produce	at	high	operative	costs,	do	not	have	sufficient	capacity	for	all	the	
residents,	are	unreliable,	and	produce	high	gaseous	emissions.	Zambia	thus	not	only	faces	a	“severe	
power	crisis”	(BMWi	2016)	in	relation	to	current	demand,	but,	according	to	the	German	Federal	
Ministry	for	Economic	Affairs	and	Energy	(BMWi	2016),	should	further	expand	its	national	grid	to	
																																																						
8http://www.energyafrica.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Energy_Africa_15/Presentation_9th_German_African_Energy_Forum
_2015_Copperbelt_Energy_Corporation_Zambia.pdf	
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replace	costly	and	environmentally	unfriendly	diesel	power	generation	plants.	The	Northwestern	
Province	is	at	the	interface	of	two	parallel,	somewhat	uncoordinated	processes:	rural	electrification	
and	the	mining	companies’	own	anxiety	to	secure	sufficient	supply	for	its	operations.	
The	Northwestern	Province	is	only	partly	connected	to	the	national	grid.	There	are	three	substations	
in	the	province:	in	Solwezi,	Kasempa	and	Lumwana	(see	table	1).	In	2012,	the	Zambia	Environmental	
Management	Agency	(ZEMA)	approved	the	connection	of	five	more	districts	to	the	national	grid	at	
132	kilovolts	(kV).	The	power	supply	will	originate	from	the	two	substations	Kasempa	(to	Mufumbwe,	
Kabompo,	Zambezi	and	Chavuma)	and	Lumwana	(to	Mwinilunga).9	Of	the	five	districts,	only	
Mwinilunga	had	been	connected	to	the	grid	at	the	time	of	writing.10	
The	Northwestern	Province,	bordering	on	Angola	to	the	west	and	on	the	DRC	to	the	north,	is	a	new	
mining	province	and	host	to	three	new	large-scale	mines	which	opened	after	2003,	following	the	rise	
in	global	copper	prices.	The	Northwestern	Province	of	Zambia	has	been	a	notoriously	neglected	
region	of	every	post-independence	government	(Peša	2014a,	2014b).	The	province	has	always	been	
seen	as	an	opposition	region	and	was	never	a	priority	for	the	state	house	–	neither	under	Kenneth	
Kaunda’s	one-party	regime	from	1973	to	1991	nor	under	any	government	or	party	since	1991.	The	
opening	of	the	mines	happened	against	the	backdrop	of	new	technologies	enabling	the	extraction	of	
ore	in	this	particular	environment.	The	three	new	mines	spread	across	an	area	of	140km;	and	each	of	
the	mines	has	spurred	the	growth	of	a	town.11	
																																																						
9	EIA	Decision	Letter:	Proposed	Connection	of	North-western	Province	to	the	National	Grid	at	132	kV	by	ZESCO	Limited,	4	
January	2012.		
10	In	addition,	a	new	district,	which	was	formed	by	the	statutory	instrument	in	2016,	Mushindamo	District,	is	also	
connected.	
11	Up	to	last	year,	all	of	them	were	in	one	district,	Solwezi	District.	But	in	late	2015,	the	large	district	was	divided	into	three,	
the	western	of	which,	called	Kalumbila	District,	now	hosts	Lumwana	and	Kalumbila	mine.	The	second	new	district	is	called	
Mushindamo	District,	east	of	Solwezi.	
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Table	1:	http://www.eiz.org.zm/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/2013-10th-July-North-CPD-Presentatation-ZESCO.pdf	
In	this	article,	I	look	at	two	of	the	province’s	three	towns,	Solwezi	and	Kalumbila.	Solwezi	town	was	
set	up	as	a	centre	for	the	colonial	administration	in	1901	“to	administer,	service	and	support	the	
mining	function”	(Maimbolwa	1980,	177)	and	today	is	the	provincial	capital	of	the	Northwestern	
Province.	Ten	kilometres	north	of	the	centre	of	the	town	is	Kansanshi	Mine,	an	open-pit	mine	which	
laid	dormant	for	almost	a	century.	Kansanshi	Mining	Plc	(KMP),	80%	owned	by	Canada-based	First	
Quantum	Minerals	(FQM),	is	currently	the	biggest	copper	mine	by	output	in	Africa.		
Within	the	past	few	years,	Solwezi	town	has	become	a	bustling,	densely	populated	and	rapidly	
expanding	town	(Negi	2009,	2010,	2011,	2014).	For	Zambians,	economic	liberalization	brought	
insecurity,	increased	casualization	of	employment,	reduced	wages,	and	fierce	competition	for	the	
few	jobs	left	in	what	is	growing	into	a	highly	mechanized	industry	(Fraser	and	Larmer	2010;	Fraser	
and	Lungu	2007;	Mususa	2010,	2012).	As	a	result	of	this,	FQM’s	arrival	in	Solwezi	spurred	massive	in-
migration	from	other,	older	mining	towns	and	from	the	rural	areas.	Solwezi	town	has	grown	from	a	
50’000	to	estimated	266’000	inhabitants	within	the	past	ten	years	only	(Preuss	and	Schmidt-
Eisenlohr	2016,	61).	The	town	has	attracted	business-minded	persons	and	suppliers	from	the	
neighbouring	province	Copperbelt	and	other	regions,	and	the	opening	of	the	mine	also	brought	
public	and	private	infrastructure	to	the	town:	the	tarring	of	some	main	public	roads	and	the	first	
Shoprite,	a	South	African-owned	supermarket	(Negi	2009,	57).		
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The	national	grid	today	extends	to	Lumwana	mine	further	west	but	does	not	reach	Kalumbila	yet,	the	
second	town	in	which	I	conducted	research.	Kalumbila	has	a	very	different	history	and	outlook	from	
Solwezi.	The	town	is	a	planned	company	town	next	to	a	new	mine,	the	Sentinel	copper	mine	which	
forms	part	of	the	larger	Trident	Project.	The	mine	opened	in	a	thinly	populated	area	of	small-scale	
cash-crop	farming.	Today,	due	to	the	influx	of	work	seekers,	it	is	a	bustling	centre	in	the	region.	In	
terms	of	electricity,	the	mine	and	the	town	still	rely	on	its	own	diesel-driven	plant	that	supplies	
roughly	200MW	of	electricity.	At	the	time	of	writing,	Kalumbila	waits	to	be	connected	to	the	national	
grid	through	ZESCO.	
The	central	state	is,	in	theory,	keen	to	develop	this	previously	–	and	in	large	parts	still	–	rural	
province,	which	is	earmarked	for	economic	growth	in	the	mining,	manufacturing,	agricultural	and	
even	tourism	sectors.	On	the	one	hand,	however,	it	struggles	to	fund	the	region’s	development	due	
to	financial	shortfalls	and	governance	issues.	On	the	other	hand,	we	see	a	pattern	of	state-company	
relation	at	work	in	many	countries	with	extractive	industries	(e.g.	Welker	2014):	the	state	holds	back	
in	putting	money	into	the	province	arguing	that	the	mines	have	an	economic	and	social	responsibility	
to	take	care	of	the	residents	where	they	operate.	The	companies	argue	that	they	pay	taxes	as	part	of	
their	duty	to	help	develop	the	country.	In	the	Solwezi	region,	the	result	of	Zambia’s	lopsided	
economy,	also	often	uncritically	referred	to	as	‘resource	curse’	(Wengraf	2017),	is	the	fact	that	the	
private,	corporate	investments	are	much	more	consequential	for	residents	than	the	(local)	state’s.	
The	Solwezi	region	represents	a	typical	example	of	this,	but	it	also	presents	the	problem	in	a	more	
accentuated	manner	due	to	rapid	urbanization	and	a	strong	player	in	town:	the	mining	company.		
To	lay	out	the	shift	from	social	differentiation	to	social	stratification	facilitated	and	produced	by	
electrical	infrastructure,	I	now	turn	to	a	brief	description	of	what	happened	in	the	Kalumbila	area	
with	the	mine’s	arrival	and	the	construction	of	a	company	town.	In	the	Kalumbila	area,	one	either	
has	electricity	or	not,	depending	on	where	one	lives.	The	mine	and	the	company	town	have	
unlimited	access	to	electricity;	and	there	is	no	load	shedding.	
4	Electricity	in	the	Company	Town	Kalumbila	
In	Kalumbila	town	and	its	surrounding	area,	the	mining	company	has	the	biggest	impact	in	terms	of	
infrastructural	development	in	general	and	electrification	in	particular.	The	fact	that	modern,	
mechanised	mines	need	electricity	to	run	their	operations	positions	the	company	as	an	important	
governing	actor	in	the	area.	The	mines	have	a	strong	interest	in	the	solution	of	the	power	crisis	(only)	
to	the	degree	that	they	can	run	their	business	uninterrupted.	Even	though	the	mining	management	
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mainly	tries	to	make	its	company	more	efficient,	their	actions,	like	the	building	of	a	town	for	its	
workers,	have	the	unintended	consequence	of	increasing	the	stratification	of	communities.12	
Approaching	Kalumbila	town,	one	passes	by	billboards	and	small	paper	boards	tacked	at	trees	
reminding	villagers	to	refrain	from	cutting	down	trees	for	the	production	of	charcoal.	With	these	and	
other	measures,	the	mine	frequently	presents	itself	as	“green”.	At	the	same	time,	however,	it	has	
rips	open	the	ground	for	the	extraction	of	copper	for	profit;	dams	water	and	pollutes	groundwater;	
resettles	hundreds	of	households;	and	generally	introduces	massive	socio-economic	change	in	an	
area	which	was	previously	rural	and	remote.		
In	Kalumbila,	the	formalization	of	the	mine’s	license	area	is	a	pending	issue	(and	an	ongoing	battle	
between	various	ministries).	Despite	this,	the	mine	started	with	the	construction	of	a	large-scale	
open-pit	Sentinel	mine	in	2012	and	has	since	run	it	with	costly	diesel	power	plants.	It	would	need,	it	
says,	30%	more	electricity	to	operate	at	full	capacity.	As	ZESCO	had	not	acted	upon	the	company’s	
pressure	to	connect	it	to	the	national	grid,	FQM	took	things	into	its	own	hand	(as	it	often	does	with	
infrastructure	indispensable	for	resource	extraction)	and	built	a	330kV,	600	kilometres	line	across	the	
country	from	the	Southern	Province	through	Central	Province	on	its	own	costs	(with	the	prospect	of	
receiving	favourable	rates	once	ZESCO	connects	the	power	lines;	see	table	1).	As	of	2017,	the	lines	
are	in	place,	only	waiting	for	ZESCO’s	commissioning.	One	could	judge	this	as	the	positive	effect	of	a	
new	mining	area:	the	mine	brings	development	to	rural	areas	previously	cut	off	from	electrical	
power.	Instead,	what	we	see	is	the	exacerbation	of	the	inequalities	that	were	already	lingering	as	a	
result	of	the	mine’s	arrival.		
Based	on	my	ethnographic	research,	I	suggest	that	people	living	in	the	area	can	be	spatially	
categorized	into	roughly	four	types	of	living	conditions.	Firstly,	there	is	a	state-of-the-art	golf	estate	
for	the	(mostly	white)	expatriate	workers	and	the	senior	and	junior	management.	I	will	describe	life	
on	a	similar	golf	estate	in	the	other	town	Solwezi	below.	The	Kalumbila	golf	estate	shares	its	main	
features	where	residents	live	a	sheltered	and	privileged	life	with	unlimited	access	to	electricity,	
water,	garbage	collection,	cleaning	services,	high-end	private	schools,	sports	and	recreation	areas	
and	a	club	house	at	an	artificial	lake.		
Secondly,	the	mine,	through	its	Kalumbila	Town	Development	Company	(KTDC)	started	building	
Kalumbila	town,	designed	by	the	Danish	firm	Gehl	Architects	for	10.000	houses	of	which	a	quarter	
have	been	built.	Workers,	both	contracted	and	subcontracted	and	mostly	men	from	the	Copperbelt	
towns,	live	in	houses	which	they	rent	from	KTDC.	Sometimes	their	families	move	with	them;	
increasingly	men	are	coming	on	their	own,	though,	with	no	intention	to	permanently	settle	in	the	
																																																						
12	Of	course,	the	different	departments	represented	in	the	management	have	different	objectives	(Welker	2014).	
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town.	KDTC’s	aim	is	to	sell	the	houses	to	workers,	but	there	is	no	bank	in	Zambia	yet	which	would	
offer	affordable	mortgage.	Residents	enjoy	access	to	electricity	and	water	but	have	to	pay	for	these	
services.	
Thirdly,	farmers,	mostly	Kaonde,	Lunda	or	Luvale	speaking,	who	lived	in	the	mine’s	license	and	the	
town	area	were	resettled	into	two	small	resettlement	areas.	They	could	choose	whether	to	be	closer	
to	the	main	road	and	thus	to	business	opportunities,	or	further	south	and	thus	closer	to	their	original	
fields.	The	initial	arrangement	of	the	villages	–	loosely	scattered,	often	shifting	and	along	small	
pathways	–	has	dramatically	changed,	especially	in	the	northern	resettlement	area.	The	houses	are	
densely	arranged	within	a	trapeze-formed	zone.	There	is,	like	before,	no	running	water	or	electricity.	
But	unlike	before,	the	areas	are	much	more	densely	populated,	boreholes	to	access	water	should	
cater	for	many	more	hundreds	of	people,	and	in-flux	from	often	better	educated	work	seekers	from	
the	Copperbelt	towns	limits	space	and	economic	opportunities	for	the	original	residents	in	the	area.	
Finally,	an	initially	small	settlement,	Chisasa,	at	a	junction	of	the	main	road	and	the	path	to	chief	
Musele’s	palace,	has	expanded	in	the	past	few	years	equally	due	to	in-migration	from	the	Copperbelt	
and	other	areas	in	the	country.	Thousands	of	work	seekers,	but	also	employees	at	the	mine	who	do	
not	want	to	spend	their	salaries	on	high	rents	in	the	company	town,	share	the	little	infrastructure	on	
land	still	under	customary	tenure.	Hygiene	is	a	pressing	problem	as	there	is	neither	running	water	
nor	electricity.	
These	four	spatial	entities	are	situated	across	a	space	of	eight	kilometre	radius.	This	stark	
differentiation	between	living	conditions,	access	to	services,	and	chance	for	employment	was	
introduced	by	the	mine.	In	some	instances,	people	were	resettled	and	(albeit	minimally)	
compensated;	in	most	cases,	people	moved	there	by	choice.	However,	the	question	of	where	to	live	
and	thus	which	services	to	access	is	not	really	a	choice	for	most	people.	It	depends	on	employment,	
and	employment	depends	on	education,	which	in	turn	is	dependent	on	social	status.		
Cynically,	the	more	“local”	a	person	was,	the	worse	off	s/he	is	now,	except	maybe	for	the	chiefly	
family.	One	could	also	say	that	the	mine’s	arrival	spatially	and	socially	segregated	persons	along	their	
place	in	the	production	process.	The	owners	of	the	means	of	production	live	outside	the	country	(in	
Canada	and	Australia);	the	managers	live	on	the	golf	estate	and	the	capital;	the	workers	live	in	a	
relatively	modern	and	well	serviced	town;	and	the	unemployed,	the	poor	and	most	women	and	
children	live	in	the	resettlement	areas	or	in	cramped	informal	compounds.	To	ameliorate	some	of	
the	worst	effects	of	the	mine’s	doings,	the	mine	rolls	out	corporate	social	responsibility	(CSR)	
programs	which	remain	selective	but	powerfully	create	new	forms	of	dependencies	(Dolan	and	Rajak	
2016;	Rajak	2011).		
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The	residents	of	these	four	spaces	have	an	opinion	about	residents	in	the	other	spaces.	In	such	
articulations,	electricity	is	often	used	to	point	out	the	difference	between	“them”	and	“us”.	For	
instance,	an	employee	of	one	of	the	companies	subcontracted	by	the	mine,	provided	with	a	little	
house	in	Kalumbila	town,	once	complained	to	me:	“People	living	in	the	golf	estate,	they	have	many	
privileges.	They	get	a	car,	airtime,	they	get	their	laundry	done	and	the	rooms	are	cleaned.	Yes,	life	is	
hard	here	in	Kalumbila	town.	And	if	they	are	off	from	work,	they	get	on	a	plane.”	In	contrast,	a	
barber	with	a	little	shop	in	Chisasa	complained	that	people	living	in	Kalumbila	town	receive	power	
for	free.	He	has	to	load	the	batteries	of	the	shavers	with	solar	energy.	During	the	loading,	he	can’t	
take	customers.	Another	example	is	a	group	of	people	from	the	resettlement	area	to	the	CSR	office,	
which	is	responsible	for	all	company-community	relations,	complaining	about	the	lack	of	electricity.	
The	CSR	staffer	was	dismissive	and	challenged	them	to	look	at	where	they	were	before	the	mine	
came.	Did	they	have	electricity?	No.	Hence,	there	was	no	reason	for	the	company	to	compensate	
them	for	something	they	did	not	have	before.	Although,	from	its	perspective,	they	do	not	fall	within	
CSR’s	responsibility,	people	living	in	the	overcrowded,	informal	town	of	Chisasa	also	complained	to	
the	CSR	office	about	missing	electrification	of	the	town.	Again,	the	CSR	office	is	dismissive	saying	that	
if	the	state’s	ZESCO	finally	expands	the	national	grid	to	the	mine	and	to	Chisasa,	they	would	also	
profit.	But	they	will	see,	CSR	staff	predicted	patronisingly,	that	rental	prices	will	go	up,	and	most	
residents	will	not	be	able	to	buy	pre-paid	electricity	anyway.		
For	people	in	the	resettlement	area,	recognizing	the	other’s	privilege	is	about	more	than	the	quest	
for	electrification.	Having	access	to	electricity	is	the	condition	for	the	possibility	to	get	a	share	of	the	
profits.	Many	thousands	were	forced	to	give	up	their	(communally	administered)	land,	water	and	
access	to	fields,	giving	up	their	lifestyles	for	some	meagre	compensation.	The	mine	caused	an	
increase	of	migrant	labour	in	the	area	which	constitutes	a	threat	to	the	original	residents’	chances	to	
profit	from	the	new	development	in	the	area.	Having	electricity	has	real	consequences.	It	means	
access	to	employment,	knowledge,	and	mobility.		
In	general,	comments	like	those	above	about	the	other	are,	I	would	argue,	a	sign	–	both	symbolic	and	
real	–	of	estrangement.	Having	electricity	or	not	divides	people	and	prevents	solidarity	between	the	
groups	created	through	infrastructural	development	in	the	area.	Through	its	acquisition	of	land	and	
the	de	facto	monopoly	over	paid	work	and	electrical	infrastructure,	the	mine	has	considerable	power	
to	shape	the	spatial	and	economic	outlook	of	the	region	but	also	sociality	between	residential	
groups.	The	mine’s	exclusive	provisioning	of	electrical	power	to	its	workers	and	the	management	
structurates	–	along	a	gendered	and	racialized	logic	–	residents	of	the	area	further.	Hence,	to	
complement	Rupp’s	argument	with	a	case	study	of	an	energy	system	which	is	almost	antithetic	to	
hers	of	New	York	city	that	lack	of	electricity	might	trigger	a	Mitmenschen	sociality,	I	would	say	that	
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unequal	access	to	electrical	infrastructure	has	estranged	people	–	across	groups	–	from	each	other	
rather	than	bringing	them	together,	to	the	extent	of	stratifying	people	into	new	social	groups.		
5.	...	And	Off.	Load	Shedding	in	Solwezi	Town	
In	Kalumbila,	the	local	state	is	hardly	visible	to	soften	the	stark	contrast	between	living	conditions	
(even	though	a	master	plan	for	a	municipal	area	close	to	Kalumbila	town	exists).	The	mine	is	more	or	
less	the	sole	governor	in	the	region	with	intermittent	conflicts	with	the	local	authorities,	which	are	
often	resolved	through	the	mine	management’s	direct	line	to	various	ministries	in	the	capital	Lusaka.	
The	current	scarcity	of	electricity	in	the	country,	coupled	with	the	mine’s	de	facto	planning	authority	
makes	processes	of	distribution	precarious	and	cements	social	stratification	possibly	for	years	to	
come.	
In	Solwezi	town,	the	electricity	situation	is	different	for	two	reasons.	Firstly,	the	local	state	is	and	has	
been	more	present	in	shaping	the	infrastructural	set-up	of	the	town,	and,	secondly,	residents	across	
the	suburbs	are	victims	of	load	shedding.	Unlike	farmers	in	the	Kalumbila	area,	urban	residents	in	
Solwezi,	particularly	labour	migrants	who	come	from	the	old	Copperbelt	towns	further	east,	are	used	
to	electricity	and	its	conveniences.	They	bemoan	the	lack	of	electricity	and	other	infrastructure	in	
some	suburbs	as	proofs	for	the	backwardness	of	the	new,	dusty	mining	town	Solwezi.	Countless	
times,	I	heard	the	phrase:	“Solwezi	is	a	bush”.		
This	feeling	of	going	backward	instead	of	forward	is	greatly	exacerbated	by	the	energy	crisis	and	load	
shedding.	As	a	result	of	lack	of	access	to	electrical	power	and	load	shedding,	urban	residents	revert	
to	a	number	of	alternative	sources	of	energy	in	their	daily	lives.	As	mentioned	above,	cooking	with	
wood	or	charcoal	is	extremely	wide-spread	(e.g.	Mavhunga	2013);	followed	by	solar	panels,	car	
batteries,	and	gas.	People	charge	their	cell	phones	at	stalls;	they	listen	to	the	radio	with	the	help	of	a	
solar	panel	bought	at	the	Chinese	shop;	and	they	generally	use	different	sources	of	energy.	Certainly,	
the	ability	to	exploit	different	sources	according	to	the	need	and	availability	is	not	to	be	
romanticized.	It	has	many	consequences,	the	most	important	of	which	is	the	entrenchment	of	
unequal	gender	relations	within	and	beyond	households.	Many	households	do	not	buy	electrical	
energy	but	rather	have	a	young	woman	doing	additional	work,	such	as	washing	clothes.	Load	
shedding	also	produces	more	work	for	aides,	such	as	fetching	water	at	a	water	kiosk	when	water	
pressure	at	the	tap	has	receded	due	to	lack	of	power.	For	one,	this	entrenches	the	pattern	of	gender	
relations	where	women	do	the	household	work.	It	is	not	only	a	gender	issue	but	also	a	question	of	
class,	though.	The	young	–	often	related	-	women	are	mostly	from	families	which	cannot	afford	to	
send	their	children	to	school.		
While	many	urban	residents	are	somehow	coping	with	the	lack	of	electric	power	and	constant	load	
shedding,	a	great	many	are	severely	limited	in	pursuing	their	income	strategies	and	receiving	public	
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services.	A	number	of	individuals,	businesses	and	institutions	are	dependent	on	electricity	and	
cannot	easily	revert	to	other	sources	of	power.	Small	and	midsize	businesses	which	rely	on	electric	
power	suffer	the	most	from	power	cuts.	Meat	or	fish	rots	earlier;	computers	or	printers	need	
expensive	backup	systems;	water	supply	becomes	patchy	when	pumps	stop	working.	As	a	result,	
prices	for	basic	goods	increase.	Individuals	who	run	a	business	must	adjust	their	working	rhythm	to	
the	power	cuts,	too.	Professionals’	laptops	stop	running	once	the	battery	is	flat.	A	tailor	would	get	up	
in	the	night	when	the	bright	light	of	the	bulb	she	left	on	woke	her	and	told	her	that	power	was	back	–	
and	start	working	on	the	sewing	machine	for	the	rest	of	the	night.	Pupils	and	students	do	their	
homework	in	candlelight	which	makes	them	sleepy	earlier.	
Power	cuts	also	have	massive	effects	on	the	quality	of	public	services	as	provided	by	the	municipal	
council	to	the	residents	of	the	town.	The	civic	centre	in	Solwezi	does	have	a	generator	but	usually	no	
cash	for	diesel	to	run	it.	When	working	at	the	Planning	Department	for	a	couple	of	months	in	2015	as	
an	intern,	I	realized	that	the	council	is	organized	along	the	assumption	of	constant	flow	of	electricity.	
The	offices	are	always	packed	with	“clients”,	councillors	or	friends	and	relatives	checking	on	the	
progress	of	their	affairs.	The	council	is	simply	not	sufficiently	staffed	to	deal	with,	say,	the	land	
disputes	arising	from	the	influx	of	migrants	and	the	expansion	of	the	mine’s	license	area.	There	is	
also	little	bureaucratic	continuity	of	how	to	file	and	archive	these	processes.	More	recently,	software	
was	introduced	to	help	the	decentralized	units	managing	data	and	making	it	accessible	across	
departments.	Power	cuts	are	thus	jeopardizing	an	already	ramshackle	system	of	data	organisation	
and	storage.	For	town	residents,	load	shedding	has	immediate	effects.	When	power	goes	off,	officers	
usually	sit	idle.	This	means	that	residents’	dossiers	are	not	worked	on	and	they	are	put	off	for	
another	day.		
When	there	is	no	electricity	for	a	while,	water	recedes,	too,	as	the	pumps	need	electricity.	For	many,	
lack	of	water	is	worse	than	lack	of	electricity	(cf.	Björkman	2015).13	The	majority	of	Solwezi	residents	
are	not	connected	to	water	pipes	but	instead	buy	water	from	water	kiosks	run	by	the	Northwestern	
Water	and	Sewerage	Company,	or	get	it	from	streams,	hand-dug	wells	or	community	boreholes	
(Preuss	and	Schmidt-Eisenlohr	2016,	76–79).	The	latter	are	also	drying	up	earlier	in	the	year	than	
usually	because	of	low	rainfall	and	the	mine’s	extensive	use	of	water	to	separate	the	copper	from	the	
ore.	Indirect	consequences	of	power	cuts,	no	running	water	and	further	distances	to	fetch	water,	
affect	households	and	cement	gender	relations	within	families	and	communities.		
A	site	where	social	differences	are	clearly	visible	is	the	golf	course	area.	The	privilege	of	the	mining	
companies	for	almost	unlimited	access	to	electricity	expands	beyond	its	operations	in	the	pit	to	
where	its	senior	and	junior	management	and	expat	workers	live.	Although	there	is	some	
																																																						
13	In	2015,	a	few	cases	of	cholera	were	reported	in	Lusaka.	
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differentiation	among	the	management	of	the	mine,	too,	their	families	live	in	a	well-protected	and	
guarded	area	situated	literarily	in	the	midst	of	a	town	struggling	to	provide	services	to	its	residents.	
About	200	people,	including	children,	live	on	this	so-called	golf	estate	(others	in	the	mine	village	
within	the	license	area),	somewhere	between	the	old	centre	of	Solwezi	Town	and	the	mining	area	
further	north.	The	golf	estate	literally	provides	greener	pastures	and	forms	some	kind	of	enclave	
(Appel	2012b,	2012a,	241;	but	see	also	Welker	2014,	79ff.).	A	river	is	dammed	for	pleasure	and	for	
water	supply;	the	grass	is	green	throughout	the	dry	season;	the	houses	are	built	with	burnt,	high-
quality	bricks;	and	the	private	primary	and	secondary	schools	are	striving	to	be	the	best	in	the	
country	and	in	Southern	Africa.	Many	residents	are	professionals	from	South	Africa,	Zimbabwe,	
Australia,	New	Zealand	and	other	countries	with	a	tradition	and	expertise	in	mining.	
On	which	side	of	the	guarded,	electric	fence	one	lives	determines	whether	one	has	power	cuts	and	
running	water,	or	not.	To	level	this	stark	expression	of	inequality,	the	estate’s	management	at	some	
stage	in	2016	introduced	what	they	call	a	“solidarity	cut”.	Three	short,	scheduled	power	cuts	across	
the	week	were	meant	to	show	solidarity	with	the	ordinary	residents	outside	the	golf	estate.	This	was	
a	purely	artificial	exercise	not	based	on	necessity;	and	it	proved	rather	futile	as	it	was	incidentally	
introduced	at	a	time	when	ordinary	residents	in	Solwezi	did	not	experience	any	cuts	at	all	due	to	the	
pre-election	phase	(see	below).	Needless	to	say	that	such	solidarity	cuts	do	not	contribute	to	re-
distribution	of	resources	between	the	privileged	and	others.	In	fact,	the	latter	did	not	even	know	
about	this	demonstration	of	goodwill.		
Residents	at	the	golf	estate	not	only	live	in	an	“extractive	enclave”	as	Appel	(2012)	describes	it	for	
on-	and	offshore	sites	in	Equatorial	Guinea,	but	in	an	“energy	enclave”	that	does	not	trigger	
Mitmenschen	sociality	between	two	social	classes	separated	by	an	electric	fence.	Ironically,	the	
solidarity	cuts	brought	more	guests	into	the	estate’s	social	venue,	the	Club,	which	has	suffered	from	
poor	attendance	by	the	estate’s	residents.	This	unintended	consequence	of	increased	engagement	
among	often	quarrelling	families	seems	reminiscent	of	Rupp’s	description	of	New	York	
neighbourhood	sociality	during	blackouts.	
In	sum,	residents	of	Solwezi	town	adjust	their	daily	routines	and	work	distribution	within	households	
to	the	recently	introduced	load	shedding.	Some	are	better	positioned	to	do	so	than	others.	Overall,	
load	shedding	reinforces	social	differentiation	in	the	everyday	lives	in	a	context	where	people	are	
used	to	and	dependent	on	electrical	power	and	its	benefits.	When	power	goes	off	in	the	town	
planner’s	office,	there	is	a	brief	moment	of	shared	smirking	at	the	supposedly	incompetent	political	
party	in	power,	the	Patriotic	Front	(PF).	A	minute	later,	however,	power	cuts	have	their	immediate	
effects	on	each	of	them	–	differently.	Moments	of	Mitmenschen	sociality	are	short;	the	reality	of	a	
differentiated	society	kicks	in	quickly.	Electricity	has	the	potential	to	further	stratify	society:	it	makes	
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people	notice	the	difference	between	themselves	and	the	other.	This	aspect	of	an	energy	
distribution	ethics	becomes	particularly	visible	when	looking	at	how	the	energy	crisis	and	energy	
distribution	play	out	in	the	political	realm,	where	I	turn	to	now.	
6	The	Politics	of	Energy	Distribution	
While	in	theory	load	shedding	seems	to	hit	everybody	except	for	the	mine	and	its	housing	
complexes,	for	people,	this	does	not	translate	into	an	experience	that	everybody	is	the	same.	Only	
certain	actors	can	make	decisions	about	energy	distribution,	and	the	fact	that	load	shedding	and	
energy	are	distributed	unequally	is	fodder	for	rumours	and	the	basis	for	political	moves.	In	what	
follows,	I	look	at	the	ways	in	which	energy	provision	is	used	as	a	tool	by	politicians	and	civil	servants.	
The	mining	companies	are	usually	protected	from	cuts	or	tariff	hikes.	When,	in	2015,	the	state	
announced	that	mines	would	also	see	30%	cuts	in	power	supply,14	at	a	time	when	copper	prices	
lingered	near	their	six-year	low,	the	mines	threatened	with	the	retrenchment	of	30%	of	their	labour	
force.	This	happened	several	times	between	2015	and	2016.	Usually,	the	state	backtracked;	in	one	
instance,	however,	there	were	some	cuts	of	the	supply	for	the	mines,	and	some	hundred	workers	
were	indeed	retrenched	by	the	mines.15	Power	cuts	have	real	consequences,	and	the	workers	and	
their	dependents	bear	the	brunt	of	it.	
Unsurprisingly,	people	point	at	inequalities	with	reference	to	power	cuts	and	its	consequences.	In	
most	cases,	the	energy	discourse	is	an	entry	point	for	the	political	opposition	to	criticize	the	ruling	
party	PF.	The	energy	crisis	in	Zambia	is	not	a	clear-cut	issue	for	many	Zambians.	While	the	state	has	
reiterated	continuously	that	the	load	shedding	is	due	to	climate	change	and	low	water	levels	in	the	
reservoirs,	people	are	not	entirely	sure	about	that.16	Many	attribute	it	to	mismanagement	in	the	
ZESCO	board,	suggesting	that	the	energy	company	should	be	taken	over	by	private	investors.	The	
fact	that	CEC	does	not	cut	power	to	the	mines	is	seen	as	proof	that	private	ownership	would	work	
better	and	more	efficiently.	For	original	residents	of	the	Solwezi	region,	traditionally	an	opposition	
region,	load	shedding	is	a	clear	sign	of	the	ruling	party’s	failure	to	develop	the	country	and	instead	
robbing	its	citizens	of	public	resources	for	personal	gain.	But	even	in	Solwezi,	there	are	many	
supporters	of	the	ruling	PF,	some	of	which	are	working	for	the	local	state.		
There	is	one	suburb	in	Solwezi,	the	Stadium	Area,	where	many	civil	servants	live	for	reasons	of	
accessibility	to	services	and	the	size	of	plots	and	houses.	Residents	sceptical	of	the	state’s	theory	of	
																																																						
14	http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-11/zambia-to-cut-copper-mines-power-supply-by-30-amid-shortage	
15	http://mgafrica.com/article/2016-01-07-starved-of-electricity-first-quantum-to-cut-730-jobs-at-zambia-copper-mine	
16	The	official	version	is	clear:	power	production	is	restricted	due	to	low	water	levels.	State	officials	have	repeated	this	
throughout	2015	and	2016,	see	for	instance	https://www.lusakatimes.com/2016/10/27/zesco-resumes-8-hour-load-
shedding/	As	an	anthropologist,	it	is	difficult	for	me	to	say	anything	meaningful	on	the	topic	except	for	pointing	at	what	
people	say.	I	am	not	in	a	position	to	comment	on	what	is	essentially	a	technical	question.	
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low	water	levels	would	often	point	at	this	suburb.	“During	the	night,	Stadium	Area	has	power,	you	
can	see	it!”.	The	fact	that	power	is	cut	off	along	feeders	is	thus	used	to	read	the	town	through	the	
lens	of	political	favouritism.		
Many	instances	feed	people’s	suspicion	that	the	issue	is	not	the	lack	of	water	in	the	reservoirs.	The	
time	from	late	2014,	when	President	Michael	Sata	passed	away	in	office,	to	early	2015	when	
President	Edgar	Lungu	was	elected	as	his	successor	in	a	fiercely	contested	election	both	within	and	
outside	the	PF,	right	until	August	2016	when	regular	elections	took	place,	can	be	described	as	an	
uninterrupted	phase	of	campaigning.	Both	Lungu	and	his	main	challenger,	Hakainde	Hichilema	from	
the	United	Party	for	Social	Development	(UPND),	visited	Solwezi	frequently	as	it	grew	into	an	
important	power	base	for	either	party.	Whenever	one	of	them	was	in	town,	load	shedding	stopped	
across	town.	People	wondered	how	this	was	possible.	Why	can	suddenly	something	be	done	against	
load	shedding?	And	has	the	President	a	direct	line	to	the	ZESCO	board	to	request	for	uninterrupted	
power	supply?	Surely,	corruption	must	be	at	play	here,	opposition	supporters	tried	to	convince	me.	
Feeding	suspicion	even	more	was	the	fact	that	about	eight	weeks	before	the	regular,	general	
elections	on	August	11,	2016,	the	whole	country	experienced	almost	uninterrupted	power	supply.	
The	rainy	season	2015/2016	was	certainly	not	capable	of	alleviating	power	shortages.	Where,	then,	is	
power	coming	from?	Pre-election	rumours	circulating	among	opposition	supporters	predicted	a	
massive	electricity	tariff	hike	in	case	the	PF	would	win	again.	This	did	not	happen	immediately,	a	fact	
which	might	be	related	to	a	tight	and	contested	election	outcome	(Fraser	2016).	In	May	2017,	
however,	the	Energy	Regulation	Board	approved	ZESCO’s	application	of	a	75%	tariff	adjustment	to	be	
effected	in	two	phases	(50%	effective	on	May	15	and	25%	on	September	1,	2017).	The	tariff	
adjustment	applies	across	all	customers	categories	except	for	the	mines.17	
Faced	with	criticism	of	their	performance,	not	surprisingly,	the	central	state	and	local	authorities	try	
to	solve	the	power	crisis.	Like	in	many	other	places	in	the	world,	electricity	is	a	signifier	of	
development	(cf.	Winther	2016)	and	rural	and	peri-urban	communities	aspire	to	be	connected	to	the	
national	grid.	As	Love	and	Garwood	show	for	Alto	Peru:	“To	have	electricity	is	to	be	engaged	with	the	
broader	world”	(2016,	157).	In	the	Solwezi	region,	the	local	authorities’	aim	is	twofold:	to	produce	
more	energy	and	to	improve	access	to	electricity	for	urban	and	rural	households.	Working	towards	a	
solution	of	the	energy	crisis	brings	its	own	problems,	though.	It	is	a	technical	task,	but	while	pursuing	
it,	more	than	mere	technical	implementation	happens.		
The	local	authorities,	together	with	civil	servants	from	ZESCO,	have	to	make	decisions	as	to	who	
should	profit	first	from	the	extension	of	the	power	lines.	In	Solwezi,	a	considerable	number	of	new	
																																																						
17	http://www.erb.org.zm/press/statements/tariffDecisionSpeech10.05.2017.pdf	
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suburbs	–	or	compounds	–	where	most	migrants	settle	are	not	connected	to	the	grid	at	all,	even	
though	a	high-voltage	line	connecting	the	substation	with	the	mine	soars	above	them	(cf.	Love	and	
Garwood	2016,	159).	This	is	similar	to	how	the	Gwembe	Tonga	people	must	have	felt	when	Kariba	
Dam	was	built	in	Southern	Zambia	in	the	1950s	to	feed	the	mines	in	the	Copperbelt	with	energy.	The	
resettled	farmers	saw	the	power	line	running	across	their	villages	and	fields	without	the	prospect	of	
being	integrated	into	“modernisation”	(Tischler	2014).	Many	of	the	newly	emerging	compounds	in	
Solwezi	are	not	even	on	town	land,	but	in	areas	under	customary	land	tenure.	
Rather	than	a	broad	rollout	of	basic	services	across	the	town,	the	council	typically	focuses	on	some	
identified	key	stakeholders	in	the	governance	of	the	region.	This	process	is	often	driven	by	the	
elected	councillors	who	are	voted	into	council	by	their	ward	and	tasked	with	bringing	development	
into	often	remote	areas.	In	committee	meetings	or	in	informal	chats	with	civil	servants,	elected	
councillors	campaign	for	attention	of	their	own	ward,	and	often	clash	with	civil	servants’	rather	
exclusive	attention	on	the	urban	areas.	Elected	councillors	and	officers	share,	however,	the	interest	
to	have	a	good	working	relationship	with	chiefs	and	headmen,	the	main	representatives	of	the	
traditional	authorities	in	charge	of	the	rural	areas.		
Solwezi	town	nestles	in	the	middle	of	three	chieftaincies	(under	chief	Kapijimpanga,	chief	Mumena	
and	senior	chief	Mujimanzovu),	and	the	rapid	expansion	of	the	town	into	customary	land	makes	
them	key	stakeholders	in	the	area.	A	chief	lives	and	calls	for	meetings	at	his	palace.	Palaces	are	
usually	in	very	remote	areas.	Large	efforts	are	thus	made	to	bring	electricity	and	other	infrastructure	
to	palaces.	This	of	course	reflects	a	long	history	of	relation	between	administration	and	traditional	
authorities:	a	chief	is	mollified	through	gifts	(Negi	2010).	Potentially,	though,	an	energized	palace	
benefits	the	communities	living	around	the	palace.	The	lines,	however,	also	pass	by	hundreds	of	
homesteads	and	villages	which	do	not	benefit	from	rural	electrification.	
In	sum,	the	distribution	of	access	to	electricity	is	a	political	issue	not	only	from	an	analytical	
perspective	but	also	for	residents.	Given	the	visibility	of	electrical	infrastructure	(lit	suburbs,	street	
lamps,	power	lines	above	one’s	head,	etc.),	the	energy	discourse	becomes	tangible.	Electricity	thus	
makes	differences	visible,	exacerbates	them,	and	offers	an	entry	point	for	criticism	of	the	elite.		
7	An	Energy	Distribution	Ethics		
Over	the	two	years	of	energy	crisis	in	Zambia,	energy	ethics	have	been	increasingly	formulated	as	a	
social	class	critique.	Criticism	of	current	distribution	among	groups,	across	suburbs,	between	the	
town	and	the	mine,	expats	and	Zambians,	etc.,	pop	up	here	and	there	in	subtle	ways	not	always	easy	
to	be	recognized	as	a	criticism	of	the	status	quo.	Most	critical	voices	are	articulated	along	party	
political	lines.	Some	of	the	critical	voices	extend	beyond	better	service	provision	to	redistribution.	
When	people	comment	on	a	group	socially	perceived	as	different	by	pointing	out	their	privileges,	this	
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is	already	a	sign	of	stratification,	preventing	Mitmenschen	sociality.	I	tried	to	show	that	these	
processes	of	separating	people	from	one	another	are	to	a	considerable	extent	produced	through	
infrastructural	things.	Fences	are	obvious,	electricity	is	subtler.	For	both	it	is	true	that	things	are	
more	than	symbols	of	privilege	or	neglect	(Larkin	2013);	they	change	status	and	enable	or	disable	
certain	forms	of	sociality,	which	in	turn	may	be	the	seed	for	political	action.	
This	socio-material	energy	assemblage	–	made	up	of	practices,	discourse	and	institutions;	and	
humans	and	things	–	as	I	describe	it	in	the	article	is	both	localized	and	bound	to	a	geopolitical	locale	
but	also	a	direct	product	of	the	global	economy	and	historically	grown	transnational	power	relations.	
Although	my	interlocutors	are	fully	aware	of	the	political	economy	of	extractivism,	to	a	certain	
extent,	the	mining	sector	manages	to	appropriate	public	discourses	on	development	and	to	silence	
criticism	against	its	extractivist	and	detached	mode	of	business.	
Added	to	its	dependency	on	the	global	commodity	markets,	Zambia,	like	most	countries	in	Southern	
Africa,	faces	drought	and	water	scarcity,	both	outcomes	of	global	warming	that	dramatically	reduce	
electricity	supply	within	Zambia	and	in	the	region.	Sovacool’s	first	of	three	moral	questions	–	“Are	we	
being	fair	to	the	present	generations	in	giving	some	people	disproportionate	access	to	the	benefits	of	
energy	while	giving	others	its	burdens?”	(Sovacool	2013,	2)	–	is	thus	immanently	important	here.	The	
current	electricity	crisis	in	Zambia	serves	as	a	warning	sign	beyond	Zambia	of	what	might	happen	
when	energy	supply	is	short	and	when	questions	of	distributions	are	left	out	for	too	long:	power	
relations	are	cemented	and	social	stratification	of	society	increases.		
An	energy	ethics	must	from	the	very	beginning	include	the	question	of	distribution.	We	cannot	come	
up	with	a	distribution	key	on	a	national	level	alone,	though–	just	as	sustainability	cannot	be	solved	
on	one	continent	only,	and	just	as	extractivism	has	always	been	a	global	endeavour.		
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